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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a considerable debate on the advantages and
disadvantages of moving towards a full mark-to-market accounting system for
financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies. This debate
has been triggered by the move of the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to
make changes in this direction as part of an attempt to globalize accounting
standards (Hansen 2004). There are two sides to the controversy in the de-
bate. Proponents of mark-to-market accounting argue that this accounting
method reflects the true (and relevant) value of the balance sheets of financial
institutions. This in turn should allow investors and policy makers to better
assess their risk profile and undertake more timely market discipline and cor-
rective actions. In contrast, opponents claim that mark-to-market accounting
leads to excessive and artificial volatility. As a consequence, the value of the
balance sheets of financial institutions would be driven by short-term fluctu-
ations of the market that do not reflect the value of the fundamentals and
the value at maturity of assets and liabilities.
This is a complex debate with many relevant factors. In this paper we
focus on one particular issue. We argue that using market prices to value the
assets of financial institutions may not be beneficial when financial markets
are illiquid. In times of financial crisis the interaction of institutions and
markets can lead to situations where prices in illiquid markets do not reflect
future payoﬀs but rather reflect the amount of cash available to buyers in the
market. The level of liquidity in such markets is endogenously determined
and there is liquidity pricing. If accounting values are based on historic costs,
this problem does not compromise the solvency of banks as it does not aﬀect
the accounting value of their assets. In contrast, when accounting values are
based on market prices, the volatility of asset prices directly aﬀects the value
of banks’ assets. This can lead to distortions in banks’ portfolio and contract
choices and contagion. Banks can become insolvent even though they would
be fully able to cover their commitments if they were allowed to continue
until the assets mature.
The potential problems that might have arisen had Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM) been allowed to go bankrupt illustrate the issue. The
Federal Reserve Bank of New York justified its action of facilitating a private
sector bailout of LTCM by arguing that if the fund had been liquidated many
prices in illiquid markets would have fallen and this would have caused further
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liquidations and so on in a downward spiral. The point of our paper is to
argue that using accounting values based on market prices can significantly
exacerbate the problem of contagion in such circumstances. The notion that
market prices cannot be trusted to value assets in times of crisis has a long
history. In his influential book, Lombard Street, on how central banks should
respond to crises, Bagehot (1873) argued that collateral should be valued
weighting panic and pre-panic prices. Our conclusion is similar in that in
times of crisis market prices are not accurate measures of value.
To better understand the role of diﬀerent accounting methods during
crises, we present a model with a banking sector and an insurance sector
based on Allen and Gale (2005a) and Allen and Carletti (2006). Banks
obtain funds from depositors who can be early or late consumers in the
usual way. The distinguishing feature of banks is that they have expertise
in making risky loans to firms. They can invest in long and short term
financial assets as well. They use the returns of the short asset to satisfy the
claims of depositors withdrawing early and the returns from the loans and
long asset to pay the late consumers. We focus on the case where the banks
are always solvent despite the risk of their loans. The insurance companies
insure a second group of firms against the possibility of their machines being
damaged the following period. They collect premiums and invest them in
the short asset to fund the costs of repairing the firms’ machines.
In this framework there are three main elements that are necessary for
contagion to occur.
• There must be a source of systemic risk. We show how such risk can
arise optimally in the insurance sector.
• The banking and insurance sectors must both hold a long asset that
can be liquidated in the market so there is the possibility of contagion.
In our model credit risk transfer can induce the insurance companies
to hold the long asset as well as the banks.
• Liquidity pricing of the long asset can interact with mark-to-market
accounting rules to produce contagion even though with asset values
based on historic cost there would be none.
Even when there is not contagion, we show that mark-to-market rules
may cause banks to distort their portfolio and contract choices to ensure
they remain solvent.
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We start by considering the operation of the banking and insurance in-
dustries separately. Conditions are identified where it is optimal for the
insurance companies to insure firms when only a limited number of machines
are damaged, and go bankrupt when a large number of machines are dam-
aged. This partial insurance is optimal if the probability of a large amount
of damage is small and the return on the long asset is high so the opportu-
nity cost of investing in the short asset is also high. The failure of insurance
companies does not involve deadweight costs and does not spill over to the
banking sector because the two sectors have only the short asset in common.
The insurance sector though is a potential source of systemic risk in the
economy.
In order for there to be contagion to the banking sector, it is necessary
that both sectors hold the long asset. The insurance sector only needs to
hold the short asset to pool the risk for the firms whose machines may be
damaged. However, if credit risk transfer is introduced to allow the bank-
ing and insurance sectors to diversify risk, insurance companies may find it
optimal to hold the long asset. This provides the potential for contagion of
systemic risk from the insurance sector to the banking sector.
When insurance companies hold the long asset theymust liquidate it when
they go bankrupt. The market they sell the asset on will involve liquidity
pricing. In order to induce some market participants to hold liquidity to
purchase assets, there must be states in which asset prices are “low” so the
participants can make a profit and cover the opportunity cost of holding
the short asset in the other states. The low prices are determined by the
endogenous amount of liquidity in the market rather than the future earning
power of the asset. If accounting values are based on historic cost, the low
market prices do not lead to contagion. Banks are not aﬀected by the low
prices. They remain solvent and can continue operating until their assets
mature. In this case the credit risk transfer improves welfare. The insurance
companies hold the more profitable long asset and there is no unnecessary
and costly contagion when they go bankrupt.
In contrast, when assets are priced according to market values, low prices
can cause a problem of contagion from the insurance sector to the banking
sector. Even if banks would be solvent if they were allowed to continue,
the current market value of their assets can be lower than the value of their
liabilities. Banks are then declared insolvent by regulators and forced to sell
their long term assets. This worsens the illiquidity problem in the market
and reduces prices even further. The overall eﬀect of this contagion is to
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lower welfare compared to what would happen with accounting values based
on historic costs. In some cases banks will structure their portfolios and
deposit contracts to remain solvent so that contagion is avoided. However,
even in this case there is a distortion.
Our results have important implications for the debate on the optimal
accounting system. In particular, it stresses the potential problems arising
from the use of mark-to-market for securities traded in markets with scarce
liquidity. In this sense, the accounting-induced contagion that we describe
could emerge in the context of many financial institutions and markets and
our results should be interpreted as one example of the phenomenon.
We discuss the implications of our analysis for the recent accounting stan-
dards SFAS 157 and IAS 39. These do have a number of safeguards to ensure
that the prices used are appropriate for valuation purposes. The criterion
for using prices is that there is an active market with continuously available
prices. We suggest that it is also necessary that the market be liquid in
the sense that it can absorb abnormal volume without significant changes in
prices.
Our paper is related to a number of others. Plantin, Sapra, and Shin
(2004) show that, while a historic cost regime can lead to some ineﬃciencies,
mark-to-market pricing can lead to increased price volatility and suboptimal
real decisions due to feedback eﬀects. Their analysis suggests the problems
with mark-to-market accounting are particularly severe when claims are long-
lived, illiquid, and senior. The assets of banks and insurance companies are
particularly characterized by these traits. This provides an explanation of
why banks and insurance companies have been so vocal against the move to
mark-to-market accounting. In the current paper an additional reason for
banks and insurance companies to be disturbed by mark-to-market account-
ing is provided. Using market values can induce contagion where accounting
values based on historic costs would not.
Other papers analyze the implications of mark-to-market accounting from
a variety of perspectives. O’Hara (1993) focuses on the eﬀects of market value
accounting on loan maturity, and finds that this accounting system increases
the interest rates for long-maturity loans, thus inducing a shift to shorter-
term loans. In turn this reduces the liquidity creation function of banks and
exposes borrowers to “excessive” liquidation. In a similar vein, Burkhardt
and Strausz (2006) suggest that market value accounting reduces asymmetric
information, thus increasing liquidity and intensifying risk-shifting problems.
Finally, Freixas and Tsomocos (2004) show that market value accounting
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worsens the role of banks as institutions smoothing intertemporal shocks.
Diﬀerently, our paper focuses on liquidity pricing to show that an undesirable
aspect of market value accounting is that it can lead to contagion.
Allen and Carletti (2006) analyze how financial innovation can create
contagion across sectors and lower welfare relative to the autarky solution.
However, while Allen and Carletti (2006) focus on the structure of liquidity
shocks hitting the banking sector as the main mechanism generating conta-
gion, we focus here on the impact of diﬀerent accounting methods and show
that mark-to-market accounting can lead to contagion in situations where
historic cost based accounting values do not.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a model
with a banking and an insurance sector. Section 3 considers the autarkic
equilibrium where the sectors operate in isolation. Conditions are identified
for systemic risk to arise in the insurance sector. Section 4 analyzes the
functioning of credit risk transfer and the circumstances in which it can
induce insurance companies to hold the long asset. Section 5 considers the
interaction of liquidity pricing and accounting rules. In particular, it is shown
that mark-to-market accounting can result in contagion even though with
historic cost accounting there would be none. An example is presented in
Section 6 to show that the conditions derived in the previous sections can be
satisfied and the eﬀects analyzed are possible. Section 7 contains a discussion
of the implications of our analysis for accounting standards. Finally, Section
8 contains concluding remarks.
2 The model
The model is based on the analyses of crises and systemic risk in Allen and
Gale (1998, 2000, 2004a-b, 2005b) and Gale (2003, 2004), and particularly in
Allen and Gale (2005a) and Allen and Carletti (2006). A standard model of
intermediation is extended by adding an insurance sector. The two sectors
face risks that are not perfectly correlated so there is scope for diversification.
There are three dates t = 0, 1, 2 and a single, all-purpose good that can be
used for consumption or investment at each date. The banking and insurance
sectors consist of a large number of competitive institutions and their lines of
business do not overlap. This is a necessary assumption, since the combina-
tion of intermediation and insurance activities in a single financial institution
would eliminate the need for markets and the feasibility of mark-to-market
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accounting.
There are two securities, one short and one long. The short security is
represented by a storage technology: one unit at date t produces one unit at
date t+1. The long security is a simple constant-returns-to-scale investment
technology that takes two periods to mature: one unit invested in the long
security at date 0 produces R > 1 units of the good at date 2. We can think
of these securities as being bonds or any other investment that is common to
both banks and insurance companies. Initially we assume there is no market
for liquidating the long asset at date 1.
In addition to these securities, banks and insurance companies have dis-
tinct direct investment opportunities and diﬀerent liabilities. Banks canmake
loans to firms. Each firm borrows one unit at date 0 and invests in a risky
venture that produces B units of the good at date 2 with probability β and
0 with probability 1 − β. There is assumed to be a limited number of such
firms with total demand for loans equal to z, so that they take all the surplus
and give banks a repayment b (≤ B), as we describe more fully below. We
assume throughout that there is no market for liquidating loans at date 1.
Banks raise funds from depositors, who have an endowment of one unit
of the good at date 0 and none at dates 1 and 2. Depositors are uncer-
tain about their preferences: with probability λ they are early consumers,
who only value the good at date 1, and with probability 1− λ they are late
consumers, who only value the good at date 2. Uncertainty about time pref-
erences generates a preference for liquidity and a role for the intermediary as
a provider of liquidity insurance. The utility of consumption is represented by
a utility function U(c) with the usual properties. We normalize the number
of depositors to one. Since banks compete to raise deposits, they choose the
contracts they oﬀer to maximize depositors’ expected utility. If they failed
to do so, another bank could step in and oﬀer a better contract to attract
away all their customers.
Insurance companies sell insurance to a large number of firms, whose
measure is also normalized to one. Each firm has an endowment of one unit
at date 0 and owns a machine that produces A units of the good at date
2. With probability α state H is realized and a proportion αH of machines
suﬀers some damage at date 1. Unless repaired at a cost of η < A, they
become worthless and produce nothing at date 2. With probability 1−α state
L is realized and a proportion αL of machines suﬀer some damage and need to
be repaired. Thus, there is aggregate risk in the insurance sector in that the
fraction of machines damaged at date 1 is stochastic. Firms cannot borrow
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against the future income of the machines because they have no collateral and
the income cannot be pledged. Instead they can buy insurance against the
probability of incurring the damage at date 1 in exchange for a premium φ
at date 0. The insurance companies collect the premiums and invest them at
date 0 in order to pay the firms at date 1. The owners of the firms consume at
date 2 and have a utility function V (C) with the usual properties. Similarly
to the banks, the insurance companies operate in competitive markets and
thus maximize the expected utility of the owners of the firms. If they did not
do this, another insurance company would enter and attract away all their
customers.
Finally, we introduce a class of risk neutral investors who potentially
provide capital to the banking and insurance sectors. Investors have a large
(unbounded) amount of the goodW0 as endowment at date 0 and nothing at
dates 1 and 2. They provide capital to the intermediary through the contract
e = (e0, e1, e2), where e0 ≥ 0 denotes an investor’s supply of capital at date
t = 0, and et ≥ 0 denotes consumption at dates t = 1, 2. Although investors
are risk neutral, we assume that their consumption must be non-negative
at each date. Otherwise, they could absorb all risk and provide unlimited
liquidity. The investors’ utility function is then defined as
u(e0, e1, e2) = ρW0 − ρe0 + e1 + e2,
where the constant ρ is the investors’ opportunity cost of funds. This can
represent their time preference or their alternative investment opportunities
that are not available to the other agents in the model. We assume ρ >
R so that it is not worthwhile for investors to just invest in securities at
date 0. This has two important implications. First, since investors have
a large endowment at date 0 and the capital market is competitive, there
will be an excess supply of capital and they will just earn their opportunity
cost. Second, the fact that investors have no endowment (and non-negative
consumption) at dates 1 and 2 implies that their capital must be converted
into assets in order to provide risk sharing at dates 1 and 2.
All uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of date 1. Banks discover
whether loans will pay oﬀ or not at date 2. Depositors learn whether they
are early or late consumers. Insurance companies learn which firms have
damaged assets.
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3 The autarkic equilibrium
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the sectors work in isolation.
We use this as a benchmark for considering the interaction between liquidity
pricing and accounting methods. The first case considered is when the bank-
ing sector and the insurance sector are autarkic and operate separately. It
is initially assumed that there are no markets so that the long asset and the
loans cannot be liquidated for a positive amount at date 1. Hence if a bank
or insurance company goes bankrupt at date 1, the proceeds from the long
asset and the loans are 0.
3.1 The banking sector
Since all banks are ex ante identical and compete to attract deposits, they
maximize the expected utility of depositors. At date 0 banks have 1 unit of
deposits and choose the amount of capital e0 to raise from investors. Then
they decide how to split the 1 + e0 between x units of the short asset, y
units of the long asset and z of loans. Also, banks choose how much to
compensate investors for their capital. Since investors are indiﬀerent between
consumption at date 1 and date 2, it is optimal to set e1 = 0, invest any
capital e0 that is contributed in the long asset or loans, which have higher
returns than the short asset, and make a payout e2 to investors when loans
are successful. Given this, banks’ solve the following problem:
Max EU = λU(c1) + (1− λ)[βU(c2H) + (1− β)U(c2L)] (1)
subject to
c1 =
x
λ
, (2)
c2H =
yR+ zb− e2
1− λ , (3)
c2L =
yR
1− λ , (4)
x+ y + z = 1 + e0, (5)
e0ρ = βe2, (6)
c1 ≤ c2L. (7)
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The banks’ maximization problem can be explained as follows. Each bank
has 1 unit of depositors with λ of them becoming early consumers and 1−λ
late consumers. The first term in the objective function represents the utility
U (c1) of the λ early consumers. The bank uses the entire proceeds of the
short term asset to provide each of them with a level of consumption c1 as
in (2). The second term represents the 1 − λ depositors who become late
consumers. With probability β loans pay oﬀ B, banks receive the repay-
ment b and have to pay e2 to investors so that each late consumer receives
consumption c2H as in (3). With probability 1 − β the loans pay oﬀ 0. The
bank has only the return from the long asset and each late consumer gets
c2L as in (4). The constraint (5) is the budget constraint at date 0, while the
constraint (6) is investors’ participation constraint. Investors must receive an
expected payoﬀ which makes them break even. As already mentioned, it is
optimal to give them a repayment only when loans pay B and banks obtain
b (which occurs with probability β) so that depositors have their lowest mar-
ginal utility of consumption. Finally, incentive compatibility requires that
late consumers do not benefit from withdrawing early, i.e., U(c1) ≤ U(c2L),
which is equivalent to c1 ≤ c2L as in constraint (7). Since depositor type is
unobservable there will be a run on the bank with all depositors withdrawing
at date 1 if it is not satisfied.
Substituting the constraints (2)-(6) into the objective function (1), and
noting that y = 1+e0−x−z from (5), we can reduce the number of decision
variables to x, z and e0. The banks’ problem then reduces to choosing x, z
and e0 to solve the following problem:
Max EU = λU(
x
λ
) + (1− λ)[βU
µ
(1 + e0 − x− z)R+ zb− e0(ρ/β)
1− λ
¶
+(1− β)U
µ
(1 + e0 − x− z)R
1− λ
¶
]
subject to (7).
First of all consider equilibrium in the loan market. Given that there is
a limited number of firms that want loans relative to banks, the firms obtain
the surplus. To see how the market clearing price is determined consider the
banks’ first order conditions with respect to the choice of z and e0.
∂EU
∂z
= β(b−R)U 0(c2H)− (1− β)RU
0
(c2L) = 0, (8)
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∂EU
∂e0
= β(R− ρ/β)U 0(c2H) + (1− β)RU
0
(c2L) = 0, (9)
where c2H and c2L are as in (3) and (4), respectively. Suppose the bank
changes the amount of the loans it makes and the capital it raises by an
equal amount. Adding (8) and (9) it can be seen that the eﬀect on expected
utility is
∂EU
∂z
+
∂EU
∂e0
= β(b− ρ/β)U 0(c2H).
It follows that there can only be equilibrium in the loan market when
b = ρ/β < B.
Thus banks are indiﬀerent between providing loans and not providing them.
At this price, banks satisfy firms’ total demand for loans so that z = z. The
optimal level of capital e0 is given by (9).
As far as the choice of x is concerned, the solution depends on whether
the constraint (7) binds or not. If it does not bind (that is, if c1 < c2L), then
the first order condition for the choice of x is
∂EU
∂x
= U
0
(c1L)−R[βU
0
(c2H) + (1− β)U
0
(c2L)] = 0.
If (7) does bind, then the bank invests an amount x = λyR/(1 − λ) in the
short asset such that c1 = c2L.
One important issue concerns the role that capital is playing in the bank-
ing sector. Since the suppliers of capital are risk neutral they provide risk
smoothing to the depositors in the bank. The assets their capital provides
pay oﬀ when the loans do not and they only receive a payment when the
loans pay oﬀ. The reason that the providers of capital do not bear all the
risk is that capital is costly. In other words their opportunity cost of capital
is higher than the return on the long asset. If it was the same, there would
be full risk sharing and depositors would consume the same amount in every
state.
3.2 The insurance sector
We consider the insurance sector in isolation next. As already explained,
insurance companies oﬀer insurance to firms against the possibility that their
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machines are damaged at date 1 and need to be repaired at a cost η. Similarly
to the banking industry, the insurance sector is competitive. Companies
maximize the expected utility of the owners of the firms they insure and do
not earn any profits. The insurance contract can consist of partial or full
insurance. In the case of partial insurance, companies insure firms in state
H and go bankrupt in state L. In the case of full insurance, firms are insured
in both states and insurance companies never fail. Which contract is optimal
depends on the opportunity cost of providing full insurance relative to the
cost incurred in the case of bankruptcy. When the first dominates, providing
partial insurance is optimal and the insurance sector is subject to systemic
risk.
We start with the case of partial insurance. Companies charge a premium
φp at date 0 and invest it in the short asset to have liquidity to satisfy
the claims αHη at date 1. Given the insurance sector is competitive, the
companies maximize the expected utility of the owners of the firms they
insure and set the premium φp = αHη. Thus, firms’ owners have an expected
utility given by
EVp = αV (C2H) + (1− α)V (C2L)
where
C2H = A+ (1− φp)R, (10)
C2L = φp + (1− φp)R. (11)
Firms pay φp and, since there is no market for liquidating the long asset
at date 1 and their owners consume only at date 2, they find it optimal to
invest the remaining 1− φp directly in the long asset and obtain the return
(1 − φp)R in both states. Then in state H (which occurs with probability
α) all damaged assets are repaired and the owners of the firms can consume
the additional return A. In state L the insurance companies cannot satisfy
all claims αLη and go bankrupt. Their assets are distributed equally among
the claimants so that each firm receives φp.
One way to avoid bankruptcy in state L is for the insurance companies
to provide full insurance and repair the damaged assets in both states H and
L. To do this, the insurance companies charge a premium φf = αLη ≤ 1 at
date 0 and invest it in the short asset. Firms’ expected utility now equals
EVf = αV (C2H) + (1− α)V (C2L)
where
C2H = A+ (1− φf)R+ (φf − αHη), (12)
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C2L = A+ (1− φf)R. (13)
Diﬀerently from before, firms’ owners can consume the return A from the
assets at date 2 in both states and the return R from investing their remain-
ing (1− φf) funds in the long asset. In state H the insurance companies use
αHη to meet their claims and, given they operate in a competitive industry,
distribute the remaining φf − αHη funds to the firms. In state L they re-
ceive claims αLη and use all their funds to satisfy them so that nothing is
distributed to the firms.
The optimal insurance scheme maximizes the expected utility of the firms’
owners. Thus, partial insurance is optimal if EVp ≥ EVf , which can be
expressed as
αV (A+ (1− αHη)R) + (1− α)V (αHη + (1− αHη)R) (14)
≥ αV (A+ (1− αHη)R− (αL − αH)η(R− 1)) +
(1− α)V (αHη + (1− αHη)R+A− αHη − (αL − αH)ηR) .
Despite avoiding bankruptcy, full insurance may not be optimal. Insuring
firms in both states requires the insurance companies to charge a higher
premium (φf > φp). Thus providing full insurance implies a cost in terms of
foregone return on the more profitable long asset held by the firms. When
this cost is too high, providing full insurance is not optimal. With these
considerations in mind, it is straightforward to see that the inequality (14)
is more likely to be satisfied
• the higher is the probability α of the good state H,
• the smaller is the return of the asset A,
• the larger is the return of the long asset R, and
• the larger is the diﬀerence in the proportion of damaged assets αH−αL.
As a final remark note that there is no role for capital in the insurance
sector so that E0 = 0. The reason is that capital providers charge a premium
to cover their opportunity cost ρ. Insurance companies should invest the
capital provided by investors in the short asset since it is not optimal to
hold any of the long asset. There are already potentially enough funds from
customers to hold more of the short asset but it is not worth it. If there is a
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premium to be paid for the capital it is even less worth it. Capital will not
be used in the insurance industry unless companies are regulated to do so.
In what follows we assume that partial insurance is optimal so that (14) is
satisfied and also that the expected utility from partial insurance is greater
than self-insurance and other partial strategies. This assumption ensures
that there is systemic risk in the insurance sector.
4 The functioning of credit risk transfer
In the previous sections we have considered how the banking and insurance
sectors operate in isolation. We have shown that the insurance sector is
subject to systemic risk when partial insurance is optimal and the insurance
companies go bankrupt in state L. Importantly, since the insurance compa-
nies only invest in the short asset, their failure does not aﬀect the banking
sector and banks remain solvent in all states. This may not be the case,
however, if there are connections between the two sectors. For example, if
banks and insurance companies hold some common assets and these assets
can be liquidated at date 1, then the failure of the insurance companies could
potentially propagate to the banking sector. To see when this can happen,
we modify our framework in two directions. First, we consider credit risk
transfer as an example of what can induce the insurance companies to in-
vest (at least partly) in the long asset. Second, we introduce a market for
liquidating the long asset at date 1. For the moment, we just assume that
the long asset can be sold at a price P ≤ 1, which depends on the state of
the world. In the next section we focus on the determination of the market
price and study the interrelation between asset prices, accounting systems
and contagion.
Given that the shocks aﬀecting the two sectors are independent, we have
four states of the world depending on the realizations of the variables β and
α, which we can express as HH,HL,LH, and LL. The (per-capita) payoﬀs
in each state are as follows.
Table 1
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State Probability Bank Insurance Late Firms’
loans claims depositors owners
HH β × α B αHη c2H C2H
HL β × (1− α) B αLη c2H C2L
LH (1− β)× α 0 αHη c2L C2H
LL (1− β)× (1− α) 0 αLη c2L C2L
Credit risk transfer can be seen as a way to provide risk sharing between
the two sectors. As Table 1 shows, late depositors have diﬀerent payoﬀs in
states HH and HL compared to states LH, and LL, and the owners of the
firms also have diﬀerent payoﬀs in states HH and LH as compared to HL
and LL. This introduces the potential for risk sharing as a way to increase
welfare. We consider a particularly simple form of risk transfer: the banks
make a payment ZHL to the insurance companies in state HL when bank
loans pay oﬀ but insurance claims are high, while the insurance companies
make a payment ZLH to the banks in state LH when bank loans do not pay
oﬀ and insurance claims are low. For simplicity, we assume that the banks’
depositors obtain the surplus from the credit risk transfer. The insurance
companies will compete to provide the credit risk transfer that maximizes
the utility of the banks’ depositors at the lowest cost to themselves. In
equilibrium they will obtain their reservation utility, which is what they
would receive in autarky. This credit risk transfer improves diversification,
but notice that markets are still not complete.
The question is how such transfers can be implemented and what are their
eﬀects on welfare. In state HL bank loans are successful. Banks have excess
funds and use them to transfer ZHL to the insurance companies. Thus, the
only diﬀerence relative to the autarky situation is that at date 2 in states
HL and LH depositors now consume
c2HL =
yR+ zb− e2 − ZHL
1− λ , (15)
c2LH =
yR+ ZLH
1− λ . (16)
The problem is more complicated for the insurance companies. In state
LH the owners of the firms that insure their machines with the insurance
companies have plenty of funds (equal to A+ (1− φp)R), but the insurance
companies themselves do not have any. They receive αHη in claims and use
all the returns of the short asset to repair the damaged assets. In order for
15
them to be able to make the payment ZLH at date 2 to the banks they must
hold extra assets. They must charge a higher premium to the firms initially
and reduce the part of the endowment firms hold in long assets.
The insurance companies must then decide in which security, short or
long, to invest this extra amount to be able to pay ZLH . If they invest in the
short asset, they need to make an initial investment s = ZLH to be able to
make the transfer to the banks. The insurance companies can then oﬀer to
the owners of the firms an expected utility equal to
EVs = βαV (C2HH) + β(1− α)V (C2HL) + (1− β)αV (C2LH) (17)
+(1− β)(1− α)V (C2LL).
where
C2HH = A+ s+ (1− φp − s)R,
C2HL = φp + s+ ZHL + (1− φp − s)R,
C2LH = A+ s− ZLH + (1− φp − s)R,
C2LL = φp + s+ (1− φp − s)R).
The diﬀerent terms relative to the autarkic case can be understood as follows.
The insurance companies receive an initial premium φp + s from the firms
and invest it in the short asset; and the firms invest the remaining (1−φp−s)
in the long asset for a return (1 − φp − s)R in each state. Additionally, in
state HH (which occurs with probability βα), the owners of the firms enjoy
the return A of the machines and the amount s the insurance companies
distribute to them. Diﬀerently, in stateHL (having a probability of β(1−α))
the machines are not repaired and, in addition to the return from their own
investments, the owners of the firms consume what the insurance companies
distribute, φp+s and the transfer ZHL they receive from the banks. The two
remaining states, LH and LL, are similar with the only diﬀerence that the
insurance companies use s to make the transfer ZLH to the banks in state
LH and do not receive any transfer in state LL.
Things work slightly diﬀerently if the insurance companies finance the
transfer ZLH by investing in the long asset. In this case, they charge an
extra premium c such that cR = ZLH and the expected utility of the owners
of the firms becomes
EVc = βαV (C2HH)+β(1−α)V (C2HL)+(1−β)αV (C2LH)+(1−β)(1−α)V (C2LL)
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where
C2HH = A+ cR+ (1− φp − c)R,
C2HL = φp + PHLc+ (1− φp − c)R+ ZHL,
C2LH = A+ cR− ZLH + (1− φp − c)R,
C2LL = φp + PLLc+ (1− φp − c)R.
The terms have a similar interpretation to the case when the insurance com-
panies finance the transfer ZLH by investing in the short asset. The only
diﬀerence is that now the insurance companies obtain the return R in states
HH and LH on the extra premium c and liquidate it for a price PHL in
state HL and PLL in state LL. Also the owners of the firms make an initial
investment of (1− φp − c) in the long asset instead of (1− φp − s).
There is then a trade-oﬀ in the implementation of the credit risk transfer
for the insurance companies if PHL and PLL are lower than 1 (as we show in
the next section). On the one hand, financing ZLH with the long asset avoids
the opportunity cost s(R−1) that the insurance companies suﬀer in each state
when they invest s in the short asset. On the other hand, however, investing
in the long asset induces a loss when the insurance companies go bankrupt in
states HL and LL and have to liquidate the long asset. Depending on which
of these eﬀects dominate, the insurance companies decide how to finance the
transfer ZLH . Formally, the insurance companies choose to charge an extra
premium c and invest it in the long asset if
∂EVc
∂c
¯¯¯¯
c=0
≥Max
∙
∂EVs
∂s
¯¯¯¯
s=0
, 0
¸
. (18)
In order to make this comparison we assume that the banks and insurance
companies make the same transfer in expectation, that is such that
β(1− α)ZHL = (1− β)αZLH . (19)
Using this we can express ZHL =
(1−β)α
β(1−α)cR and ZHL =
(1−β)α
β(1−α)s when the
insurance companies finance ZLH with the long and the short asset, respec-
tively, and show that
∂EVc
∂c
¯¯¯¯
c=0
= R[(1− β)α[V 0(φp + (1− φp)R)− V 0(A+ (1− φp)R)]
+[β(1− α)PHL
R
+ (1− β)(1− α)PLL
R
− (1− α)]V 0(φp + (1− φp)R)],
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∂EVs
∂s
¯¯¯¯
s=0
= (1− β)α
£
V 0(φp + (1− φp)R)−RV 0(A+ (1− φp)R))
¤
−(R− 1)
£
(1− α)V 0(φp + (1− φp)R) + βαV 0(A+ (1− φp)R)
¤
.
To gain some insight into the circumstances where credit risk transfer will
be used and when the insurance company will fund its claim with the short
or long asset, we consider three special cases.
Case 1: R = 1, PHL = PLL = 0
In this case the long asset has no return advantage over the short asset. It
has the disadvantage that nothing is received when it is liquidated as would
occur, for example, if there was no market for the long asset. Now
∂EVs
∂s
¯¯¯¯
s=0
= (1− β)α[V 0(1)− V 0(A+ 1− φp)] > 0,
since A > φp, and
∂EVc
∂c
¯¯¯¯
c=0
= (1− β)α[V 0(1)− V 0(A+ 1− φp)]− (1− α)V 0(1)
<
∂EVs
∂s
¯¯¯¯
s=0
.
There will be credit risk transfer in this case and the insurance company will
fund its payment with the short asset.
Case 2: R = 1, PHL = PLL = 1
Here the long asset again has no return advantage and in this case it has
no liquidation disadvantage either. We obtain
∂EVs
∂s
¯¯¯¯
s=0
=
∂EVc
∂c
¯¯¯¯
c=0
= (1− β)α[V 0(1)− V 0(A+ 1− φp)] > 0.
Not surprisingly credit risk transfer is beneficial and the assets are equally
good at funding the insurance companies’ payment.
Case 3: R = V 0(φp + (1− φp)R)/V 0(A+ (1− φp)R) > 1, PHL = PLL = 1
Now the long asset is at an advantage because of its higher return and it
can also be liquidated. Here
∂EVs
∂s
¯¯¯¯
s=0
= −(R−1)
£
(1− α)V 0(φp + (1− φp)R) + βαV 0(A+ (1− φp)R)
¤
< 0,
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so the short asset will not be used. For the long asset
∂EVc
∂c
¯¯¯¯
c=0
= V 0(φp + (1− φp)R)[(1− β)α(R− 1) + 1− (1− α)R].
For suﬃciently large α and suﬃciently small β this will be positive so it will
be optimal to have credit risk transfer and the insurance companies will fund
their payment with the long asset.
Thus the possibility of sharing risk between the sectors can lead the in-
surance company to hold the long asset even though on its own it has no
need for it. We will assume that these conditions hold in what follows.
5 Liquidity pricing and accounting
In the previous sections we have analyzed the conditions where insurance
companies find it optimal to oﬀer partial insurance to the firms they insure
and where credit risk transfer induces them to invest in the long asset. These
elements constitute two of the important ingredients for contagion from the
insurance sector to the banking sector through the market for the long asset.
In this section we analyze whether the failure of the insurance companies can
propagate to the banks. We show that accounting values based on historic
costs can lead to very diﬀerent outcomes from those based on market values.
The presence of a market for the long asset at date 1 raises the issue that
somebody must supply liquidity to this market. In other words somebody
must hold the short asset in order to have the funds to purchase the long
asset supplied to the market in states HL and LL. If nobody held liquidity,
then there would be nobody to buy and the price of the long asset would fall
to zero at date 1. This can’t be an equilibrium though because by holding a
very small amount of the short asset somebody would be able to enter and
make a large profit. We consider parameter ranges such that the group that
will supply the liquidity is the investors who provide capital to the banks. In
order to be willing to hold this liquidity they must be able to recoup their
opportunity cost. Since in states HH and LH when there is no liquidation of
assets, they end up holding the low-return short asset throughout, they must
make a significant profit in at least one of the states HL and LL when there
is a positive supply of the long term asset on the market. In other words,
the price of the long asset must be low in at least one of these states, and its
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exact level will depend on the amount of assets supplied to the market and
thus in turn on the accounting method in use.
5.1 Historic cost accounting
We start with the simpler case where asset values are recorded at cost even
if there is a market and asset prices exist. This illustrates the functioning of
markets and the liquidity pricing in our model. For the moment we assume
there is no impairment so that historic cost is used even when market prices
fall below costs. We discuss the issue of impairment further in Section 7.
To see precisely how prices are formed, we first need to see how many
units of the long asset are oﬀered in the market. Let us start with the
banking sector. Banks invest x units in the short asset, y in the long asset
and z in loans. Given all these assets cost one per unit, under historic cost
accounting they are just worth x+ y+ z. The liabilities of each bank are the
deposits issued to early and late consumers. The special feature of deposits
is that they can be withdrawn on demand. At date 1 both the early and late
consumers have the right to withdraw c1. The total liabilities of the bank at
date 1 are therefore c1. Given this reflects the claims of both the early and
late consumers there are no further claims to be recorded at date 2. Thus
provided
x+ y + z ≥ c1, (20)
the banks’ assets are above their total liabilities at date 1, banks remain
solvent and continue operating until date 2. They do not liquidate any assets
at date 1.
Assuming (20) is satisfied, the price in the market for the long asset
depends on the sales of the insurance companies. In states HH and LH the
insurance companies do not sell their long assets and the investors will not
use their liquidity to buy any assets. The equilibrium price must then be
PHH = PLH = R. The reason for this is straightforward. If P < R, the
investors would want to buy the long asset since it would provide a higher
return than the short asset between dates 1 and 2. In contrast, if P > R, the
banks and insurance companies would sell the long asset and then hold the
short asset until date 2. The only price at which both the short and the long
asset will be held between dates 1 and 2, which is necessary for equilibrium
in states HH and LH, is R.
In contrast, in states HL and LL the insurance companies go bankrupt
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and will liquidate their holdings of the long asset c at a price PHL = PLL =
PL. In order for investors to supply liquidity to the market, the price PL
must be low enough to allow them to cover their opportunity cost of ρ. In
equilibrium it must be the case that
ρ = α× 1 + (1− α)× R
PL
. (21)
The term on the left hand side is the investors’ opportunity cost of capital.
The first term on the right hand side is the expected payoﬀ to holding the
short asset in states HH and LH, which occur with probability α. The
second term is the expected payoﬀ from holding the short asset in states HL
and LL, which occur with probability 1− α, and using it to buy 1/PL units
of the long asset at date 1. Each unit of the long asset pays oﬀ R at date 2.
Solving (21) gives
PL =
(1− α)R
ρ− α < 1, (22)
since ρ > R > 1. As α → 1, PL → 0. The less likely is state L where the
insurance companies go bankrupt, the lower the price of the long asset in
that state must be. Notice that this low price is purely driven by liquidity
considerations rather than the fundamentals of the asset.
The expression for PL in (22) illustrates the importance of the assumption
that ρ > R > 1. If ρ = 1 so that there is no cost to providing liquidity then
PL = R and there is no price volatility.
Taking prices as given, the insurance companies will choose the credit risk
transfer payment ZLH to the banks in state LH and given our assumptions
will fund it with c of the long asset. The banks will choose their payment
ZHL to the insurance companies in stateHL. In order for the market to clear
at PL in states HL and LL investors need to hold an amount of liquidity γ
given by
γ = PLc. (23)
The simultaneous determination of PL and γ is illustrated in Figure 1.
As explained above, the investors’ participation constraint requires that the
price be given by (22). Rearranging (23) gives
PL =
γ
c
.
This expression can be interpreted in the following way. The insurance com-
panies are bankrupt and are forced to liquidate the long asset c that they
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hold. The investors use their cash holdings γ to buy the long asset since
PL < 1 < R. The price is the ratio of the two quantities so there is liquidity
pricing. The more liquidity in the market the greater the price in states HL
and LL as illustrated in Figure 1. The point at which this line coincides with
PL gives the market clearing amount of liquidity γ.
To sum up, when historic cost accounting is used credit risk transfer can
improve welfare relative to the autarky situation. This is because credit risk
transfer improves risk sharing between the two sectors and the use of his-
toric cost accounting insulates banks’ from the bankruptcy of the insurance
companies. Even when PL is quite low so that the banks would be insolvent
using market prices there is no eﬀect on their activities. This is desirable
since they can fulfill all of their commitments.
5.2 Mark-to-market accounting, solvency and conta-
gion
The crucial feature of the equilibrium with historic cost accounting is that
the accounting value of the banks’ assets is insensitive to the bankruptcy
of the insurance companies and market prices. We now turn to the situa-
tion where mark-to-market accounting is used and analyze the mechanism
through which the bankruptcy of the insurance companies can aﬀect the ac-
counting value of the banks’ assets and how this can lead to distortions and
contagion.
The main diﬀerence compared to historic cost accounting is that the ac-
counting value of the banks’ holdings of the long asset now depends on the
market price if a market exists. If no market exists, as we continue to as-
sume for loans, the historic cost is still used. Another possible assumption
here is that since the value of the loans is zero without a market, they should
be valued at zero. Adopting this assumption only strengthens the results
concerning distortions and contagion below.
When the insurance companies sell the long asset and there is liquidity
pricing, the banks’ long assets are valued at their market price P . Incorpo-
rating this change, then similarly to 20 in order for a bank to remain open
it must satisfy the solvency condition
x+ yP + z ≥ c1. (24)
There are three possibilities concerning this condition.
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1. The equilibrium values of x, y, z, c1 and P in the historic cost case are
such that (24) is satisfied in all states.
2. The condition (24) is not satisfied at these equilibrium values and it is
optimal for the bank to choose x, y, z, and c1 so that it is satisfied in
all states.
3. It is optimal for the bank to violate (24) and go bankrupt in some
states.
In the first case where (24) is satisfied in the historic accounting case, the
condition has no eﬀect. The solution is the same as before with c1 = x/λ
and b = ρ/β.
In the second case when the solvency condition is not satisfied at the
historic cost equilibrium, the bank finds it optimal to distort its choice of
x, y, z, and c1 to ensure that it remains solvent in all states. There are
several ways it can do this.
• The bank can lower c1.
• It can increase x, y, or z and fund this increase by reducing one or more
of the others or by increasing e0.
First, consider the market for loans. So far it has been the case that
b = ρ/β. When this is the amount charged for loans, the optimal way to
satisfy the solvency condition is to increase z and fund it by an increase in
e0. In this case satisfying the solvency condition has no eﬀect on depositors’
welfare since consumption at both dates would be unaﬀected. However, this
cannot be an equilibrium since the aggregate supply of loans is fixed at z.
In aggregate the banks cannot increase z to ensure the solvency condition is
satisfied.
Instead, the banks will compete for loans by lowering b. In equilibrium
the value of b will be such that the marginal cost of satisfying the solvency
condition by changing z and e0 is equal to the marginal cost of the least
costly way of satisfying the condition. For example, if reducing c1 is the least
costly way of satisfying the condition, then b must be such that
∂EU
∂z
+
∂EU
∂e0
= −∂EU
∂c1
.
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This is one of a number of possibilities depending on which method or com-
bination of methods for satisfying the condition is optimal.
It can be shown that another way of satisfying the solvency condition
that can be optimal is to increase x and fund it by reducing y. This method
dominates increasing x and funding it by an increase in e0 since ρ > R. In
this case we have c1 < x/λ and some output is carried over from date 0 to
date 1 using the short asset. Now the expressions for consumption at date 2
must include the term (x− λc1)/(1− λ).
Another possibility is to increase y and fund it by a decrease in x. Again
this dominates funding it by increasing e0. However, if P < 1 as will be the
case with liquidity pricing then increasing y and reducing x will lower the
left hand side of the solvency condition (24) and so will not help.
Finally, changes in z have already been discussed.
It is important to note that whichever method or combination of methods
is used to satisfy the solvency condition, there is nevertheless a welfare cost
because of the distortion in portfolio and contract choices. Thus even when
there is no contagion, mark-to-market accounting can have a welfare cost.
The case where it is optimal for banks to ensure that they remain solvent
will occur when the probability of the states where the solvency condition
matters is high.
The third case is where it is optimal to violate the solvency condition and
for the bank to go bankrupt in some states of the world. In such states
c1 = c2 = x+ yP.
In the previous section with historic cost pricing, the value of P was low
in states HL and LL. If the banks go bankrupt in state HL, they will be
forced to liquidate their assets at the low market price. In this case it will no
longer be optimal for the banks to make a credit risk transfer payment to the
insurance companies. We therefore focus on equilibria where there is only
bankruptcy for banks in state LL where no credit risk transfer payments are
made. If P = PLL is low enough so that (24) is not satisfied, the banks are
declared insolvent and have to sell their long assets. The supply of the long
asset on the market in state LL is then larger, as both the banks and the
insurance companies are selling to satisfy their claims at date 2.
To see how this aﬀects the pricing of the long asset, consider first the
states, HH, HL and LH. As before, in statesHH and LH neither the banks
nor the insurance companies sell the long asset. In state HL the insurance
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companies sell the long asset while the banks do not. Diﬀerently from before,
however, the equilibrium is such that there is now excess liquidity in state
HL as well. This surplus of cash means that PHL = R by the same argument
as for PHH and PLH above. Thus, the price of the long asset at date 1 in
these three states will be
PHH = PHL = PLH = R.
Given this, the price PLL in state LL must be such that the investors sup-
plying liquidity to the market break even, and must satisfy
ρ = (1− (1− β)(1− α))× 1 + (1− β)(1− α)× R
PLL
. (25)
The terms in (25) have a similar interpretation to those in (21). The left
hand side is the investors’ opportunity cost of capital. The first term on the
right hand side is the investors’ expected payoﬀ to holding the short asset in
states HH, HL and LH (which have a total probability of occurring equal
to 1− (1− β)(1− α)). The second term is their expected payoﬀ from using
the cash in state LL (which occurs with probability (1− β)(1− α)) to buy
1/PLL units of the long asset at date 1 for a per-unit return of R at date 2.
The only diﬀerence relative to (21) is that now investors hold liquidity in all
states except state LL. This means that they have to make higher profits in
this state to induce them to hold cash at date 0. Solving (25), we obtain
PLL =
(1− α)(1− β)R
ρ+ αβ − α− β < PL < 1. (26)
Again if ρ = 1 so there is no cost to liquidity provision then PLL = R and
there is no price volatility. In this case there will be no contagion.
Note that because there is a lower probability of the low price in state LL
relative to the case with historic cost accounting, it follows that PLL in (26) is
lower than PL in (22). This implies greater price volatility, in line with one of
the arguments made by practitioners against marking to market. The greater
volatility arises because investors hold more liquidity with mark-to-market
accounting to absorb the assets of the bankrupt banks. This increases the
price in state HL and lowers it in LL relative to historic cost accounting.
Taking prices as given, the insurance companies will choose the credit
risk transfer payment ZLH to the banks in state LH and will fund it with c
of the long asset. The banks will choose their payment ZHL to the insurance
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companies in state HL. In equilibrium the total supply of the long asset to
the market in state LL is c + y. For the the market to clear at PLL, as in
(26) the investors have to hold an amount γ in the short asset between dates
0 and 1 such that
γ = PLL(c+ y).
In order for the equilibrium described to hold, it is necessary that γ =
PLL(c + y) > cR so that there is excess liquidity in state HL and PHL = R
as explained above. If γ < cR then PHL < R and investors make money in
state HL as well as in state LL. This case can be analyzed similarly.
To sum up, diﬀerently from the case with historic cost accounting, the
use of mark-to-market can generate contagion from the insurance sector to
the banking sector and leads to a reduction in welfare. The investors and
the insurance companies have the same levels of utility as in autarky. The
banks are worse oﬀ since they go bankrupt and their assets are liquidated at
a low level in state LL. However, taking prices as given the actions chosen
by the insurance companies and banks are optimal. If an insurance company
were not to engage in credit risk transfer it would still receive the same as
in autarky. If it was to use the short asset to fund its credit risk transfer
it would be strictly worse oﬀ. If a bank was to choose not to do credit
risk transfer, it would still be liquidated in state LL and it would not have
the benefit of the credit risk transfer. The expected utility of its depositors
would fall.
The reason for the poor performance of mark-to-market accounting is that
when prices are determined by liquidity rather than future payoﬀs they are no
longer appropriate for valuing financial institutions’ assets. The equilibrium
prices are low to provide incentives for liquidity provision. They are not low
because fundamentals are bad. This point has important implications for the
design of optimal accounting standards that are discussed further in Section
7.
6 An example
In this section we present a numerical example to illustrate the results above.
We assume the following values. The long asset returns R = 1.1, loans
yield B = 3 with probability β = 0.7, and firms’ total demand for loans is
z = 0.3. Depositors have utility function U(c) = Ln(c) and become early
consumers with probability λ = 0.5. Investors have an opportunity cost
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equal to ρ = 1.15. The payment to banks’ on their loans is b = ρ/β = 1.64
and their investment in loans in equilibrium is z = z = 0.3.
Banks in autarky
Using the values of the example, we get the following solution for the
bank in autarky (maximize (1) subject to (2)-(6) but ignoring (7)):
e0 = 0.25; e1 = 0; e2 = 0.42;
x = 0.5; y = 0.45; z = 0.3;
c1 = 1.00; c2H = 1.15; c2L = 1.00;
EU = 0.0487.
Comparing c1 and c2L it can be seen that the constraint (7) is satisfied in
this example.
The risk sharing between the depositors and the providers of capital is
incomplete. The late depositors’ consumption is 1.15 when the banks’ loans
pay oﬀ but only 1.00 when they do not. As explained in Section 3, the reason
is that capital is costly. In other words the opportunity cost of capital of the
providers’ of capital is higher than the return on the long asset. If it was
the same, there would be full risk sharing and depositors would consume the
same amount in every state.
Insurance companies in autarky
To provide an example where partial insurance is optimal so that there
is systemic risk in the insurance sector, we assume A = 1.15, η = 1, α = 0.9,
αH = 0.5 in state H and αL = 1 in state L. Finally, the utility function
of the owners of the firm is V (c) = Ln(c) and recall that the endowment of
each firm is 1. With partial insurance we have C2H = 1.7 and C2L = 1.05 so
that the expected utility of firms is EVp = 0.482. With full insurance it is
instead C2H = 1.65 and C2L = 1.15 so that
EVf = 0.465 < EVp = 0.482.
Thus despite providing higher consumption in state L full insurance is not
optimal because the opportunity cost of providing it is too high. The optimal
scheme is for the insurance industry to partially insure firms, charge a pre-
mium equal to αHη = 0.5 at date 0 and leave firms to invest the remaining
part 1− αHη = 0.5 of their endowment in the long asset.
Credit risk transfer
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We next consider credit risk transfer. Table 2 summarizes the payoﬀs to
the banks’ late depositors and the insured firms’ owners in autarky.
Table 2
State Probability Bank Insurance Late Firms’
loans claims depositors owners
HH 0.7× 0.9 = 0.63 B = 3 αHφ = 0.5 1.15 1.7
HL 0.7× 0.1 = 0.07 B = 3 αLφ = 1 1.15 1.05
LH 0.3× 0.9 = 0.27 0 αHφ = 0.5 1.00 1.7
LL 0.3× 0.1 = 0.03 0 αLφ = 1 1.00 1.05
There is a market for the long asset at date 1. We initially consider what
happens when there is historic cost accounting and the insurance company
uses the long asset to fund its credit risk transfer. We then consider mark-
to-market accounting and show that there is contagion.
Historic cost accounting
The assets of the banks are x = 0.5; y = 0.45; z = 0.3. If the banks’ assets
are evaluated at their historic cost, they are worth x+ y + z = 1.25. This is
above the total liabilities at date 1 of c1 = 1.00 so the banks remain solvent
irrespective of what happens to the market value of its assets.
As explained above in Section 5.1 PHH = PLH = R = 1.1. From (22)
PL =
(1− α)R
ρ− α = 0.44.
Given this value for PL, we solve the problem under the assumption that
banks retain the surplus from the credit risk transfer and the owners of the
firms enjoy the same level of expected utility as in autarky. It can be shown
that the optimal transfers are
ZHL = 0.058 in state HL and
ZLH = 0.018 in state LH.
Note that in doing this optimization, we keep the portfolios of the banks
the same as before here and below, for ease of exposition. Strictly speaking
with the transfers ZHL and ZLH the banks will reoptimize and have slightly
diﬀerent portfolios. Taking account of this change does not alter the results
below.
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The insurance companies find it optimal to fund their transfer with the
long asset. They choose c = 0.016 to provide the necessary funds. Using
(23), the amount of liquidity that the investors hold is
γ = PLc = 0.007.
The level of utility of the banks’ depositors with historic cost accounting
is
EUHC = 0.0496,
which is higher than the level of 0.0487 that they obtain in autarky.
The crucial feature of this equilibrium is that the accounting value of
the banks’ assets is insensitive to the bankruptcy of the insurance companies
and low market prices. The banks do not have to sell the long asset and can
continue until date 2.
Mark-to-market accounting, solvency and contagion
We consider the three cases outlined in Section 5. The first is where the
solvency condition is satisfied in any case at the historic cost equilibrium.
The second is where it is optimal for the banks to distort their portfolio and
contract choices so it is satisfied. The third is where bankruptcy is optimal
for the banks and contagion from the insurance sector to the banking sector
occurs.
An illustration of the first case is provided by the same example as above
except that the quantity of loans z = 0.35. Since b = ρ/β, in autarky the
only eﬀect of changing the quantity of loans is to change the amount of
capital raised and the payment for it. Thus the solution is the same as in
the above example except that e0 = 0.3 and e2 = 0.50. When there is credit
risk transfer in the historic cost regime the solvency condition is satisfied in
all states including HL and LH since
x+ yP + z = 0.5 + 0.45× 0.44 + 0.35 = 1.048 > c1 = 1.
Here mark-to-market accounting has no eﬀect on the equilibrium.
The example with z = 0.3 illustrates the second case. Now the solvency
condition just fails to be satisfied when PL = 0.44 since
0.5 + 0.45× 0.44 + 0.3 = 0.998 < 1.
If a bank keeps the same portfolio and contract choices as in the historic
cost regime then it will go bankrupt. However, since the condition is only
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just violated it is worth the bank changing its choices so that it is satisfied.
As explained in the previous section, the equilibrium in the loan market will
change and the firms’ payment on loans falls from ρ/β = 1.64 to b = 1.49 in
state H. The first eﬀect of banks choosing to satisfy the solvency condition
is thus that they are worse oﬀ because of lower loan payments. The firms
are correspondingly better oﬀ. The fall in price just leads to a transfer in
income. Since the banks and firms are price takers they perceive they cannot
aﬀect the prices.
Now −∂EU/∂c1 = −0.046 and ∂EU/∂x = −0.136 (assuming y = 1 +
e0−x−z so an increase in x is financed by a reduction in y) so it is better for
banks to satisfy the solvency condition by lowering c1. The expected utility
from satisfying the solvency condition is EU = 0.021 while with bankruptcy
it is EU = 0.010. Thus in this case it is optimal for the banks to distort
their choices to remain solvent and avoid bankruptcy. Even though there
is no contagion and bankruptcy, there is nevertheless a welfare loss due to
the distortion in choices. The banks’ depositors end up with less liquidity
insurance than is optimal.
The third case is where banks do not find it worthwhile to distort their
choices to satisfy the solvency condition and instead go bankrupt. In this
case there is contagion from the insurance sector to the banking sector. An
example that illustrates this is the same as above but with z = 0.15. Here
the equilibrium in autarky again stays the same as before except e0 = 0.10
and e2 = 0.17. Now when PL = 0.44 the solvency condition becomes
0.5 + 0.45× 0.44 + 0.15 = 0.848 < 1,
and is not satisfied. Here the changes in a bank’s portfolio and its deposit
contract necessary to satisfy the solvency condition are so large that they are
not worth implementing. The banks are better oﬀ to go bankrupt. In this
case the nature of the equilibrium changes as explained in Section 5.2. Now
PHH = PHL = PLH = R = 1.1.
In the remaining state LL it follows from (26) that
PLL =
(1− α)(1− β)R
ρ+ αβ − α− β = 0.183.
Given this price, it can be shown that the optimal transfers that keep the
insurance companies at their reservation level of utility and maximize the
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bank depositors’ welfare are
ZHL = 0.056 in state HL and
ZLH = 0.020 in state LH.
The insurance companies find it optimal to fund their transfer with the long
asset. They choose c = 0.018 to provide the necessary funds. In equilibrium
the total supply of the long asset to the market in state LL is c + y =
0.018 + 0.45 = 0.468. In order for the market to clear at PLL = 0.183 the
investors have to hold an amount γ in the short asset between dates 0 and 1
to clear the market at date 1 such that
γ = PLL(c+ y) = 0.086.
Since c = 0.018 we have Rc = 0.020 < γ = 0.086 so there is excess liquidity
in state HL as required for PHL = R above.
The low price PLL provides the incentive that is needed for the investors
to provide the liquidity for the market. However, it also means that the
banks are forced to liquidate at date 1 in state LL. The reason is that the
market value of their assets is
x+ y × PLL + z = 0.5 + 0.45× 0.183 + 0.15 = 0.733,
and this is less than their liabilities of c1 = 1.00. They therefore go bankrupt
and their long assets are liquidated in the market for 0.45 × 0.183 = 0.082.
It can then be shown that the level of utility of the banks’ depositors with
mark-to-market accounting is
EUMTM = 0.0342.
The other alternative of the banks is to change their portfolios and deposit
contract so that the solvency constraint is satisfied. Here the distortion is
again so large that it is not worthwhile to do this. It is better to go bankrupt
in state LL.
The level of utility obtained in this third case is clearly less than the de-
positors’ expected utility with historic cost accounting EUHC = 0.0496. The
example illustrates how the interaction between mark-to-market accounting
and liquidity pricing can be damaging in times of crisis. There is contagion
of the systemic risk that arises in the insurance sector to the banking sector.
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The price is low in state LL to give incentives for investors to provide liquid-
ity to the market. It does not reflect the payoﬀ on the asset itself. This is a
constant R = 1.1 in all states. The banks can meet all of their commitments
going forward. Nevertheless under mark-to-market accounting they are in-
solvent. Their premature liquidation leads to a significant loss of welfare in
this example.
7 Discussion
Much of the debate on mark-to-market versus historic cost accounting has
focused on the trade-oﬀs between the two. An alternative is to try to com-
bine the best features from both. In our analysis above we have focused on
an important disadvantage of mark-to-market accounting, namely that in
times of crisis prices in illiquid markets may not reflect future earning power
and this can lead to unnecessary distortions and liquidation. This is not
to say that in other circumstances mark-to-market does not have significant
advantages over historic cost. For example, in the Savings and Loan Crisis
in the US, historic cost accounting masked the problem by allowing losses to
show up gradually through negative net interest income. It can be argued
that a mark-to-market approach would have helped reveal the to regulators
and investors that these institutions had problems. This may have helped to
prompt changes earlier than actually occurred and that would have allowed
the problem to be reversed at a lower fiscal cost.
The recent accounting standards SFAS 157 and IAS 39 adapt the mark-
to-market approach and attempt to only use market prices when appropriate.
For example, SFAS 157 distinguishes between diﬀerent levels of input to the
valuation process. Level 1 inputs, which are to be used where possible, are
described as follows (paragraph 24).
“Level 1 inputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) in active mar-
kets for identical assets or liabilities that the reporting entity has
the ability to access at the measurement date. An active market
for the asset or liability is a market in which transactions for the
asset or liability occur with suﬃcient frequency and volume to
provide pricing information on an ongoing basis. A quoted price
in an active market provides the most reliable evidence of fair
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value and will be used to measure fair value whenever available,
except as discussed in paragraphs 25 and 26.”
The subsequent paragraphs 25 and 26 give illustrations of situations where
market prices would not be appropriate. For example, if there are not active
markets for individual assets matrix pricing may be appropriate. In other
cases, such as where announcements have been made since the market closed
the market price may need to be adjusted. These are not the only restrictions.
For example, paragraph 7 rules out prices for forced transactions such as
forced liquidations or distress sales. In cases where market prices are not
appropriate, Level 2 inputs should be used if possible. Examples of Level 2
inputs are quoted prices for similar assets in active markets, quoted prices
for identical or similar assets in inactive markets, and interest rate and yield
curves or other market corroborated inputs. If this kind of information is also
unavailable then Level 3 inputs can be used. These consist of unobservable
inputs that reflect the reporting entity’s own assumptions and information
about the asset. IAS 39 has similar provisions although the precise details
and terminology diﬀer.
These eﬀorts to adapt mark-to-market accounting are desirable. The
important question is whether they go far enough. The requirements that
markets be active and have price quotations will rule out some illiquid mar-
kets. For example, in the specific model considered in this paper the only
role of the market for the long asset at date 1 in the model is to allow the
long asset to be liquidated when the insurance companies go bankrupt. Buy-
ers are induced to participate through low prices in some states. This is the
sense in which the market is illiquid and is subject to liquidity pricing. In
this case the provisions in SFAS 157 and IAS 39 would rule out the use of
these prices as Level 1 inputs and this is correct.
However, the model can be changed slightly so that there would be con-
tinuous markets and price quotations but similar eﬀects would be observed.
For example, consider the following circumstances. There are two groups of
banks, A and B. In the first state which occurs with probability 0.5, λ+ ε of
the depositors in the Group A banks are early consumers while λ−ε are late
consumers where ε is small. In Group B banks the reverse is true so λ − ε
are early consumers and λ+ε are late consumers. In the second state, which
also occurs with probability 0.5, the reverse happens. Group A banks would
have λ− ε early consumers and λ+ ε late consumers, while Group B banks
have λ + ε early consumers and λ − ε late consumers. Overall there is no
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aggregate uncertainty about the proportion of early and late consumers, the
only uncertainty is which group of banks will have a larger proportion of early
consumers. As in Allen and Gale (2004b) and Allen and Carletti (2006) the
banks can use the market for the long asset at date 1 to reallocate liquidity.
In this case the market will have continuous trade and price quotation but it
will still be illiquid. When the insurance companies go bankrupt prices will
need to adjust as above to provide incentives for liquidity provision. In this
case there would again be the price eﬀects described in the previous sections.
What is important is not just the availability of continuous trade and price
quotation but also the ability of the market to absorb large amounts of extra
supply without the price changing significantly. If the price changes signifi-
cantly because of a large influx of supply the analysis of this paper suggests
these prices should also not be used to value the assets. A market can be
illiquid even if there is continuous trade.
If ε was suﬃciently large so that a large amount of trade occurred in the
market for the long asset in normal times then the market would be liquid
and the assets would be priced in a diﬀerent way. In this case when the
insurance firms go bankrupt the extra supply would be small relative to the
existing supply each period and prices will only change slightly to absorb
this extra supply. This price change will be insuﬃcient to attract liquidity
from outside investors. In this case the markets are liquid and the eﬀects
identified above would not be present.
To summarize, it is important for accounting standards to recognize that
illiquidity is not just about whether markets have continuous trade and price
quotation but also the extent to which they can absorb extra supply. In this
kind of illiquid market it may be better to temporarily use other methods of
pricing based on Level 2 and Level 3 inputs. Our analysis suggests that one
important input in such circumstances is historic cost.
In practice, historic cost accounting does not just use historic costs but
also adopts the principle of impairment. In other words, if market prices
drop below historic costs then values must be adjusted to reflect this. In this
sense historic cost accounting with impairment is similar mark-to-market
accounting and similar comments to those above apply.
34
8 Concluding remarks
We have shown that if there is mark-to-market accounting there can be dis-
tortions and contagion that causes banks to be liquidated unnecessarily. The
problem is that in illiquid markets in times of crisis asset prices may be low
to provide incentives to provide liquidity rather than a reflection of future
payoﬀs. In such cases other methods for pricing the assets such as historic
cost may be preferable.
A number of extensions of our analysis are possible. One important as-
sumption of the model is that contracts are incomplete. If contracts are
complete so that insurance companies’ and banks’ payouts can be made con-
tingent on the state, bankruptcy can be avoided. In states HL and LL, a
complete contract would allow insurance companies to provide no insurance
so bankruptcy would not occur. Insurance companies would then not be
forced to liquidate the long asset and there would be no contagion.
Also, we have assumed the return on the long asset R is constant. Despite
this, the price fluctuates because of liquidity pricing. If there was uncertainty
in fundamentals so R was random, the problem identified would be exacer-
bated. The price would vary with R and this would increase volatility over
and above the level with just liquidity pricing.
The model presented in this paper was developed in the context of bank-
ing and insurance. It is clear that this context is not crucial for similar
eﬀects to arise. It is the interaction of incentives to provide liquidity with
accounting rules that is key. This can occur in many contexts.
We have focused on the implications for accounting standards of market
illiquidity. However, the users of accounting information must also be wary
of the accounting numbers they utilize. If mark-to-market is adopted and
the prices are not adjusted appropriately for illiquidity, a way of mitigating
the potential for contagion is for banking regulators not to strictly apply
this accounting methodology in times of crisis. Rather than simply declaring
institutions bankrupt it may be better to wait until the episode of liquidity
pricing is over.
In our model there was only a market for the long term asset. It would
also be interesting to analyze the eﬀect of including a market for loans and
for credit derivatives. This is a topic for future research.
This paper has considered the private provision of liquidity in markets
and has not analyzed the role of central banks in liquidity provision. In
markets with widespread participation the central bank can provide liquidity
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to participants and liquidity pricing will be mitigated. However, in markets
with limited participation, it is likely that central banks may have problems
injecting liquidity that will reach the required markets and prevent the fall
in prices and contagion considered in the paper. The justification used by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for their intervention in arranging a
private sector bailout of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 explicitly
used this rationale. The LTCM case was somewhat more complex than the
model analyzed here as in addition to liquidity issues the future payoﬀs of
assets were also uncertain. However, as we argued above, this uncertainty
about fundamentals exacerbates the problem. Investigating the precise role
of central banks in this kind of situation would also be an interesting question
for future research.
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